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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Choice
of Transfer Pricing Methods in China
by
HAN Xue
Master of Philosophy
Recent scandals involving related party transactions (RPTs) have attracted
researchers’ and governments’ attention. Because imperfections exist in the
legislation of RPTs, business groups might abuse transfer pricing of such transactions
for certain purposes. These purposes include earnings management of listed
companies that seek to attract investors and profit shifting from subsidiaries to parent
companies. This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the choice
of transfer pricing methods in China.
I classify transfer pricing methods into two major groups (i.e., market-based and
cost-based methods). I hypothesize that companies with weak corporate governance
are more likely to use cost-based pricing methods, which are regarded as subjective
and more easily manipulated. According to previous studies on corporate governance,
a smaller board size, CEO-Chairman duality (i.e. the CEO and the Chairman of the
company are the same person), and a lower percentage of independent directors on
the board are indicators of weak corporate governance. Using data collected from
annual reports of Chinese listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets
from 2003 to 2005, I find that government-controlled companies are more likely to
use market-based methods than others. It is consistent with the hypothesis that
ownership has an impact on the choice of transfer pricing methods. The results also
show that when the chairman of the board and the CEO of the company is the same
person, companies are more likely to use cost-based methods. However, inconsistent
with my hypothesis, the results indicate that firms with small boards are more likely
to choose cost-based methods than firms with large boards. This study extends prior
research on transfer pricing by focusing on the impact of corporate governance.
Furthermore, this study suggests that regulators might limit transfer pricing
manipulations by stipulating a firm’s corporate governance structure. This research
also draws both regulators’ and investors’ attention to the impact of corporate
governance on transfer pricing methods.

Key words: Transfer Pricing Methods; Corporate Governance; Related Party
Transactions
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The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Choice of Transfer
Pricing Methods in China

1. Introduction
Related party transactions (RPTs) are one of the recurring areas of concern
raised by recent corporate scandals. Prior studies show that controlling shareholders
misappropriate profits of firms in emerging markets (Lo et al., 2007; Jian and Wong,
2003). Through RPTs, cash and profits are diverted away from firms in a group
either to controlling shareholders’ pockets directly or to their loss-making associates.
It has been shown that firms in developed markets also use RPTs to transfer assets
and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them (Johnson et al.,
2000).
Such income shifting of RPTs can be reduced by proper corporate governance
mechanisms (Gordon et al., 2004). Corporate governance helps to reduce the
information asymmetry between external investors and internal management. If
external capital markets could perfectly observe managers’ investment actions and
effort, there would be no need for corporate governance mechanisms to help monitor
managers, and the investor can assure themselves of getting a maximized return of
their investments.

The existing literature has found certain board characteristics

and chief executive officer (CEO) pay-performance sensitivity to be useful
governance mechanisms in ameliorating managerial agency problems (Fama and
Jenson, 1983; Fama 1980; Kelin, 2002a; Bushman et al., 2004a). For example, the
percentage of independent director on the board has been found to be positively
correlated with firm value and interpreted as indicative of good corporate governance
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(Bushman et al., 2004b; Fama and Jenson, 1983)
Early research on pricing of RPTs (i.e. transfer pricing) in multinational
companies focused primarily on issues relating to international taxation allocation
(e.g., Chan and Chow, 1997a; Jacob, 1996). However, with the growth of the
economy, especially the growth of business groups, transfer pricing has acquired a
broader significance. Some companies take advantage of transfer pricing to
manipulate their financial statements (i.e. inflate earnings) and shift income among
affiliated listed companies. For example, in order to inflate the earnings of a listed
company, a parent company or affiliated company may sell goods at very low price
to the listed company and then the listed company sells it to the market at a higher
price.

This has become a prominent phenomenon in the stock market (Hua, 2002).

The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is also aware of earnings
manipulation through transfer pricing. Consequently, the CSRC revised the
“Guideline on the Management of Listed Companies” on 7 January 2002which
explicitly mandates the conditions for conducting a related party transaction, and the
disclosure requirements.

Relevant section of the guideline (i.e., Section 3) is

summarized in Appendix 1.
This paper addresses possible abuses of transfer pricing methods in China where
such dealings are prevalent because of prevalent corporate structures, economic
institutions and the legal system. Jian and Wong (2003) show some evidence that
controlling shareholders use RPTs to manage earnings. They find that 90 percent of
Chinese listed firms are involved in different degrees of RPTs and use recurring
related party sales to manage earnings in order to meet government ROE
requirements for rights issues or to avoid being delisted. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that the current corporate governance system in China fails to constrain
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controlling shareholders from manipulating earnings and expropriating minority
shareholders through RPTs 1 .
In this study, I would like to focus on whether companies with different
corporate governance mechanisms have different preferences for transfer pricing
methods in RPTs.

There are two common types of transfer pricing methods,

market-based methods and cost-based methods. Market-based methods are based on
fair market prices, which are less susceptible to manipulation. Cost-based methods
are basically determined by internally generated data, and this is easier to manipulate
(MaAulay and Tomkins, 1992; Merville and Petty, 1978; Thomas, 1971; Anthony
and Dearden, 1980; Cook, 1995; Granick, 1975). Therefore, companies tend to use
cost-based methods to manage their earnings through RPTs. As such, this study
focuses on answering the following question: How is the choice of transfer pricing
methods (i.e., cost-based or market-based) in related party transactions affected by
characteristics of the company, such as ownership of the company (e.g.,
government-controlled or others) or board characteristics (e.g., the percentage of
inside directors, dual CEO/chair position)?
In this paper, I test the hypotheses by analyzing 4,515 RPTs conducted by
Chinese listed firms over the period from 2003 to 2005. The results indicate that (i)
non-government-controlled companies and (ii) the companies with the same person
acting as the CEO and chairman of the board are more likely to choose cost-based
transfer pricing methods, which are consistent with the hypothesis. However,
inconsistent with my hypothesis, I find that companies with small board size are
more likely to use cost-based transfer pricing methods and percentage of independent
1

A well-known example in China is Sanjiu Medicine (0999). The controlling shareholder (Sanjiu Group) and
other related parties owed 2.5 billion RMB (96% of the company’s total assets) to the listed company. They
seriously expropriated minority shareholders’ interest. CSRC circulated a notice of criticism towards Sanjiu
Medicine.
(CSRC website: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n575742/n2529771/2608081.html).
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directors on the board do not have a significant impact on the choice of pricing
methods. The results are robust after controlling for industry, firm size, preferential
income tax rate, and amounts of RPT.
As far as I understand, there is no prior research that examines how corporate
governance affects management decisions on transfer pricing methods. Thus, this
study enriches the extent literature on moral hazard behavior 2 as a consequence of
dysfunctional corporate governance.

My research shows that firm that has weak

corporate governance are more likely to employ cost-based pricing methods for
earnings manipulation. Thereby, this study provides further evidence for disguised
moral hazard behavior resulting from dysfunctional corporate governance.
Furthermore, this study provides policy implications that facilitate regulators’
efforts to control the abuse of RPTs through corporate governance mechanisms and
regulation of pricing methods. By specifying the corporate organizational structure
and corporate governance practice, the regulators can efficiently reduce transfer
pricing manipulation without further incurring additional monitoring and disclosure
cost.

For

example,

the

results

provide

empirical

evidence

that

non-government-controlled and Chairman-CEO duality firms are more likely to
choose cost-based pricing methods and these firms are considered to have poor
corporate governance. Regulators can draw up some rules specifically towards firms
who have those characteristics.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews relevant
literature on transfer pricing methods and corporate governance. Section 3 presents
the institutional background of transfer pricing in Chinese listed companies. Section
4 lays out the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research methodology.
2
Practically, the moral hazard behavior can be broadly classified into four categories: insufficient effort,
extravagant investments, entrenchment strategies and self-dealing (Tirole, 2006). RPTs can be used for
self-dealings.
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Finally, Section 6 discusses the empirical findings and Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Institutional Background

Before we develop our hypothesis, it is necessary to briefly recount the
institutional background of China’s listed company and China’s stock market since
the development of China’s stock distincts from most of the capital markets around
the world.

2.1 Ownership structure
Under China’s economic reform, state-owned enterprises were restructured. The
reform decentralized management decision rights from the government to its
state-owned firms, while allowing the government to remain as the controlling
owner.
One of the purposes of creating a capital market in China was to improve
state-owned enterprise’s corporate governance. Under the previous planned
economic system, state-owned enterprises acted simply as manufacturing plants
executing government orders. The state expected that going public would facilitate
the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and that a well-functioning corporate
governance system would be established. In reality, although a huge volume of funds
was raised through the stock market, corporate governance remained an unsolved
problem. There are two key aspects of corporate governance issues affecting the
Chinese stock market, namely relationships between listed subsidiaries and parent
companies and ownership concentration.
i) Listed subsidiaries and parent companies
Born out of a central command economy that is now in a transition period, the

5

Chinese stock market and Chinese listed companies reflect some of the serious
weaknesses of their macro-environment. The low-quality corporate governance in
listed companies can be traced back to these weaknesses.
One of the main characteristics of Chinese listed companies’ ownership
structure is usually the existence of parent companies. It is a common practice in
developed stock markets for large groups to be entirely publicly held, but in China, a
listed company will often be a subsidiary of an unlisted business group. After
witnessing the success of the Japanese Keiretsus and the Korean Chaebols in the
1970s and 1980s, the Chinese government has encouraged the establishment of
corporate groups (Keister, 2000). The government has formed bureaus to assemble
firms in similar industries or closely related industries, facilitate them to develop
trades and other relations, and build their administrative structures. Therefore, driven
by government directions and economic forces, some large corporate groups were
developed in the 1980s and 1990s from primarily state-owned enterprises affiliated
with the central government or local governments.
State-owned business groups often carve out their most profitable business units
for a public offering, in order to meet IPO requirements and achieve a higher IPO
price (Aharnoy et al., 2000). The original enterprise, consisting of the remaining
unprofitable units, then becomes the parent company of the newly listed company.
Usually, the same team controls the board and management of both the listed
company and its parent company, and the listed company is under the absolute
control of its parent, since only a small proportion of shares are traded in the market.
The listed company is viewed by its parent as a platform for financing in the stock
market and a cash vehicle for the whole group’s internal capital market (Srinidhi et
al., 2004). Since the parent company is not listed, there is little or no information on

6

the parent publicly available to investors.
Chen et al. (2003) find that rather than using the popular Western technique of
accruals, most listed Chinese firms manage their earnings though real transactions,
for instance by providing credit to a risky client or by RPTs such as a sale of fixed
assets to their parent companies.
ii) Ownership concentration
Another characteristic of the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is the
restrictions on share transfer. There are various classes of shares in China and most
of them are non-tradable.
a.

State-owned shares: shares obtained by a state institution in exchange for a

capital contribution made by that institution to a corporation.
b.

Domestic legal-person shares: sponsor’s 3 shares held by domestic legal

persons.
c.

Foreign legal-person shares: sponsor’s shares held by foreign legal persons.

d.

Private placement of legal-person shares: shares issued by private placement

and subscribed by legal persons other than sponsors.
e.

Employee shares: shares held by company staff, issued by private placement

of companies and yet not listed at the current time.
State-owned shares are held by central and local governments, which are
represented by local financial bureaus, state asset management companies, or
investment companies. State-owned shares can also be held by the parent of the listed
company, typically a state-owned enterprise. They are not tradable. Domestic
institutions such as industrial enterprises, securities companies, trust and investment
companies, foundations and funds, banks, construction and real estate development
companies, transportation and power companies, and technology and research
3

The term of ‘sponsor’ is used to refer to an initial investor/subscriber.
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institutes hold legal person shares. These institutions are further classified according
to their ownership structures as state-owned enterprises, state-owned nonprofit
organizations, collectively owned enterprises, private enterprises, joint stock
companies, and foreign-funded companies. Legal person shares are not tradable.
State-owned and legal person shares can be transferred to domestic institutions upon
approval of the CSRC. As to employee shares, companies may sell such shares to
management and employees, typically at a significant discount, at the time of going
public. These shares have to be held for 6 to 12 months after an IPO, and can then be
sold on the stock exchanges following approval by the securities regulatory
authorities. In 1998 the regulatory authorities issued a circular ruling that the
issuance of employee shares should be discontinued. As a result, the number of
employee shares is gradually falling.
Publicly traded shares, the only shares actually traded in mainland China,
account for less than one-third of the total shares in existence. Ding et al. (2005)
calculate the proportion of negotiable shares to total equity for all listed companies at
the end of 2003. They find out that more than four-fifths of those companies’
majority shares are not tradable.
A survey appearing in the book titled “Corporate Governance and Enterprise
Reform in China: Building the Institutions of Modern Markets” (Tenev et. al., 2002)
shows that a similarity shared by ownership structures of some West European
companies and East Asian firms is the mutual ownership among different companies.
In terms of types of largest shareholders, China is differentiated by the absence of
significant ownership by individuals and families, the negligible role of financial
institutions and institutional investors, and the large state role. These features have a
direct bearing on the types of corporate governance issues that China faces. Perhaps
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the most important implication of the dominant role of state ownership in China’s
listed companies is the control the government can exert over management
appointments and incentives, and thereby over companies’ behavior.

2.2 Related party transactions
In 1997, the China Ministry of Finance, which serves as the accounting
standards setter in China, issued an accounting standard for RPTs, “Related party
transaction disclosure and its transactions” (hereafter, the RPT Standard), which
requires publicly listed companies to disclose all material RPTs in the notes to the
financial statements. Related parties, as defined by the RPT Standard, include the
listed firm’s parent company, affiliated companies 4 , its management, board members,
principal owners, or members of the immediate families of any of these groups.
Listed companies should disclose all transactions including trading of goods, services
or assets with related parties. Table 2 shows the types of RPTs that should be
disclosed by Chinese listed firms.
(Insert Table 2 here)
2.3 Corporate governance in China
After entering the World Trade Organization, the government of the PRC has
made some progress on corporate governance. According to the World Bank Group
(1999), corporate governance is about maximizing value subject to meeting a
corporation’s financial, legal, and contractual obligations. This inclusive definition
stresses the need for boards of directors to balance the interests of shareholders with

4

No disclosure is required for RPTs with subsidiaries which are consolidated in financial statements. However,
for affiliated companies which the listed company can exert significant influence over that are not consolidated
(i.e. ownership between 20% and 50%), disclosures are required.

9

those of other stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, investors and
creditors, in order to achieve long-term sustained value. Recognizing the importance
of corporate governance to the continuous development of the Chinese capital
markets, the CSRC promulgated a consultation paper, “Guiding Opinion for Listed
Companies on the Establishment of Independent Non-Executive Directors Systems”,
and the corresponding final version of “Guideline on the Management of Listed
Companies” in 2001 and 2002 respectively.
However, despite the CSRC’s admirable intentions and the comprehensive
coverage of its Guideline, its effectiveness will depend very much on its practical
implementation. Some of the practical problems that domestically listed companies
may have with the corporate governance initiative are:
i) Imprecise wording
As the criteria for compliance with the Guideline are not clearly defined, there
are plenty of grey areas and ambiguities that leave room to maneuver for companies
who wish to abuse the system. For example, independent directors have been praised
as guardians of corporate governance, and champions and protectors of minority
shareholders. However, the Guideline and the Guideline Opinion for Listed
Companies on the Establishment of an Independent Directors System are not clear on
who actually has the power to appoint independent directors. If majority shareholders
dominate the appointment of the independent directors, the whole board may still be
effectively under the control of those majority shareholders.
Secondly, although the CSRC has provided a detailed guideline for determining
directors’ independence as stated in article 3, there are still some loopholes in the
description. According to the world’s most influential Corporation Governance
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Codes 5 , a company’s ex-employee can only be qualified as an independent director
after a certain cooling off period. For example, a period of five years is required by
the New York Stock Exchange and the California Public Employees Retirement
System in the U.S., while three years are required by the Australian Stock Exchange.
However, the CSRC guideline requires only a one-year break time for an
ex-employee to be an independent director, which is far from the actual concept of
being truly independent. The whole idea of introducing independent directors is to
provide objective and independent judgment on management’s performance, without
being influenced by the company’s management or major shareholders. But, after
only one year of cooling off the ex-employee might still have some sort of loyalty or
connection with the company, which makes it difficult for him/her to raise opposition
or act tough on the managers.
Thirdly, the CSRC guideline does not clearly specify whether a company’s
current non-executive directors can switch to be independent directors. In China, a
listed company has a certain number of non-executive outside directors, who either
come from the firm’s controlling shareholders or other affiliations. For example, a
director of a Chinese listed firm could simply be transferred and become an
independent director in the following year. As a result, the company could then meet
the CSRC’s requirement to have at least one-third of board members that are
independent. Officially, this non-executive director may be qualified as an
independent director, but by serving at the same firm and the same board for a certain
period, how independent can he or she be? Furthermore, the minimum requirement
of one-third independent directors is relatively low. For example, in the U.S., boards
should be comprised of a substantial majority of “independent” directors. At a

5

For details, please refer to the official website of SEC about corresponding rules:
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm
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minimum, these directors should meet the definition of “independent director” as
given by the relevant non-official regulatory organizations standards 6 . According to a
1999 survey conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, the average percentage of independent directors on companies’ board
of directors was 62 percent in the U.S.. Therefore, the minimum requirement for the
percentage of independent directors in China is comparatively quite low.
ii) Immature corporate governance environment

Unlike those in more mature securities markets, shareholders in the PRC stock
markets polarize into majority and minority shareholders. Majority shareholders are
typically very strong and individual minority shareholders are extremely weak, and
there are only a few sophisticated institutional minority shareholders such as pension
funds, mutual funds and financial institutions to counter the influence of the majority
shareholders. Thus, under this immature corporate governance environment,
opportunistic behavior is likely to occur through RPTs.

6

For example, CalPERs in April 13, 1999 promulgated the Corporate Governance Core Principles and Guidelines
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3. Literature Review

Previous empirical studies on transfer pricing in developing countries are quite
limited, with most studies focusing on firms operating in the United States, Japan,
and other major developed countries. Prior studies suggest that the governments of
developing countries are more vulnerable than those of developed countries to
transfer pricing abuse because of the lack of institutional frameworks and expertise
and the inadequacy of resources to tackle this issue (Brean, 1979; Plasschaert, 1985;
Rahman and Scapens, 1986).

3.1 Factors affecting transfer pricing decisions and the choice of transfer pricing
methods
There is a wide diversity of transfer pricing practice for both domestic and
international intra-corporate operations. Surveys by Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994)
show the diversity of transfer pricing methods and the multiplicity of policies used.
They conclude the there are no universal or cure-all transfer prices. They also suggest
that whether a company applies a market price, a cost price, or multiple pricing is not
really the crux of the issue. What is more important is whether the transfer prices
benefit the strategic and structural circumstances of the particular company, and
reflect the operational realities of the divisions involved in the internal trade.
Previous studies on transfer pricing mainly analyzed transactional corporations
(i.e. TNCs) in the U.S. and other developed countries. Tang and Chan (1979) finds
that the overall company profit is the primary factor affecting method choice and the
determination of subsidiary performance is the most important objective. No
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significant relationship between TNC size and transfer pricing method was found.
Wu and Sharp (1979) find that transfer pricing criteria differ by industries for U.S.
TNCs. Primary criteria include compliance with tax and tariff regulations and profit
maximization. Burns (1980) identifies the most influential factors affecting transfer
pricing decisions as market conditions and competition in the host country,
reasonable profit for the subsidiary, and U.S. income tax regulations. Yunker (1982)
finds that larger firms tend to use market-based methods. Important environmental
factors include overall market conditions and demand for the product, government
regulations and restrictions, and economic conditions. According to Borkowski
(1992), there is no relationship between transfer pricing method and industry, and
smaller TNCs prefer cost-based methods. In detail, the transfer pricing decisions are
affected by tax and customs rates and regulations, and the relative ease of using the
transfer pricing method. In a replication of his earlier study, Tang (1993) confirms his
prior findings of no relation between TNC size and pricing methods. The
environmental factors affecting method choice were overall TNC profit, tax rate and
regulation differences, and restrictions on repatriation of profits.
Chan and Chow (2001) investigated the international transfer pricing methods
adopted by multinational corporations (MNCs) in China and how their choices are
affected by corporate environments. This study adopts a structured interview
methodology with the management of large foreign investment enterprises in China
to obtain the data for testing the research hypotheses. A total of 64 useable responses
were provided and included in the final sample. This study explains the impacts of
corporate environments that are of particular relevance to the choice of transfer
pricing methods in developing countries. The empirical results reveal that foreign
investment enterprises having local partners' participation in management tend to use
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market-based transfer pricing methods while foreign investment enterprises not
having local partners' participation in management tend to use cost-based transfer
pricing methods. The analysis also shows that two other corporate attributes, i.e.
source of investment and activity orientation, are significant to the choice of transfer
pricing methods when analyzed separately. Multivariate analysis reveals that the
likelihood of adopting cost-based or market-based transfer pricing methods depends
on both local partner's participation in management and the source of foreign
investment of a foreign investment enterprise.
Luft and Libby (1997) also aim to find the factors affecting the choice of
transfer pricing methods. This paper focuses on the fairness of transfer pricing
methods and reports case-based questionnaire responses. These responses indicate
that transfer pricing negotiations expect fairness-based price concessions that
moderate the influence of an outside market price when the outside market price
strongly favors one of the parties. Motivated by this study, Kachelmeier and Towry
(2002) investigate whether these expectations of fairness relate to the actual prices
that result from real-cash negotiations. They perform an experiment with 48 M.B.A.
student volunteers by distributing a transfer pricing case in two settings. In one
setting, a computerized negotiation mechanism is used in which the only
communications are bids, asks and acceptances. In the other setting, the parties
negotiate face-to-face, with no restrictions on communication. The results indicate
that expectations of fairness-based price concessions do not survive actual
negotiations when participants negotiate in the first setting. Conversely, both
expectations and actual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based price concessions
when participants negotiate in the second setting. Kachelmeier and Towry’s (2002)
findings imply that firms can influence the extent to which an outside market price
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determines a negotiated internal transfer price by changing the means of negotiation.
There are a few papers that focus on the effects of management’s perceptions
and managerial autonomy on the choice of transfer pricing methods, such as Chan
and Lo (2004), and Chan et al. (2006). Chan and Lo (2004) investigate the
association between the management’s perception of the importance of
environmental variables and its choice of international transfer pricing methods in
the context of a developing country. Field interviews were conducted with the
management of large foreign investment enterprises in China. These foreign
investment enterprises included main investors from the U.S., Japan, and Europe.
The results indicate that the more important management perceives the interests of
local partners and the maintenance of a good relationship with the host government
to be, the more likely that the foreign investment enterprise will use a market-based
transfer-pricing method. On the other hand, the more important management
perceives foreign exchange controls in transfer-pricing decisions, the more likely the
foreign investment enterprise will choose a cost-based method. Overall, there is
moderate agreement between U.S. and non-U.S. foreign investment enterprises on
the relative importance of the environmental variables studied. Furthermore, Chan et
al. (2006) examine the impact of managerial autonomy on tax compliance in an
international transfer pricing context. They specially study whether foreign
subsidiaries’ autonomy in making pricing and sourcing decisions on intra-firm
transfers affect their profit shifting through international transfer pricing. They
measure transfer pricing noncompliance in terms of tax audit adjustments made by
tax authorities. Based on a sample of 163 transfer pricing audits on foreign
investment enterprises in China, they find that tax audit adjustments for foreign
investment enterprises that have autonomy in setting transfer prices or sourcing form
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outsiders are smaller than those that have their transfer transactions dictated by
parent companies.
Other factors, such as inducing truthful forecasts of demand from buying units,
may also affect the choice of transfer pricing methods. Shih (1996) notice that
previous studies on transfer pricing have one common trait; they only report what
firms do with regard to transfer pricing but do not delve into the rationales behind the
practices. Shih (1996) take one extra step to test whether the strategic concern of
inducing truthful forecasts of demand from buying units affects transfer pricing
decisions. A questionnaire was sent to the controller, treasurer or financial
vice-president (in order of preference) of each of the 400 largest Canadian firms. The
results show recurring transfer relationships are less likely to be priced at variable
cost than are non-recurring transfers. The result is consistent with the hypothesis that
inducing truthful forecasts of demand from buying units at the capacity planning
stage has a larger influence on pricing of long-term transfer relationships.
In conclusion, there are number of factors affecting the choice of transfer
pricing methods.

Tax minimization and earnings management are the two most

common motivations for transfer pricing manipulation. Management characteristics
and the external market environment also have significant effects on the choice of
transfer pricing methods. This study, by relating choice of transfer pricing to
corporate governance, identifies some factors affecting the transfer pricing decision
that are not investigated by previous studies.
3.2 Corporate Governance
This study tries to identify the role of corporate governance in preventing
management’s opportunistic behaviors (abuse of pricing methods in RPTs in this
study) Before going to the hypotheses development, a brief summary on existing
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corporate governance empirical findings will be explained. According to previous
studies, corporate governance has been characterized as a set of mechanisms
protecting investors from opportunistic behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dennis
and McConnell, 2002). Although there is not direct measure on the strength of
corporate governance, empirical regularities identify that board characteristics and
ownership structures are indicative to corporate governance (Hermalin and Weisbach,
2003) These mechanisms may be internal or external. Internal mechanisms include
dispersed ownership structures, independent boards of directors, formal board
processes, timely and accurate disclosure of relevant information, etc.; external
mechanisms include the existence of active external take-over markets, a
shareholder-friendly legal infrastructure, well-established capital markets, etc. This
study investigates the impacts of two main internal governance mechanisms,
ownership structures and board characteristics.

3.2.1 Ownership
A defining characteristic of China’s listed companies is the concentration of
ownership. As stated by the Chinese government, the original purpose of the stock
market is to help state-owned enterprises raise funds and improve their operating
performance. For this historical reason, the majority of current listed Chinese
companies originated from restructured state-owned enterprises and is still controlled
by the State and/or other non-listed state-owned enterprises. Aharony et al. (2000)
provides evidence that most of China’s newly listed firms are restructured from
existing state-owned enterprises. Theoretically, ownership structure is one of the
indispensable elements of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) because
large owners, via their voting rights, can effectively monitor and govern the
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management team. However, recent developments in corporate governance theory
have highlighted the conflict of interests that manifests through action being taken by
the controlling shareholders for their own benefit, at the expense of minority
shareholders, and this is called “tunneling” (Johnson et al., 2000). Because of such
conflict of interests, some Chinese firms may have incentives to engage in RPTs with
their parent companies and other affiliates. Ding et al. (2007) investigate the role
played by a firm’s ownership structure in earnings management, with reference to the
Chinese capital market. Analyzing 273 state-owned and privately-owned Chinese
companies listed in 2002, they establish a link between firm’s ownership structure
and earnings management practices. The results show that the entrenchment effect of
ownership concentration on earnings management is weaker in privately-owned
listed firms than in state-owned listed firms. Liu and Lu (2003) state that in China,
most listed companies are spin-offs from large state-owned enterprises and, in most
cases, they still share personnel functions, capital, and assets with their parent
companies. Local governments, instead of shareholder committees, appoint the
management of listed firms. Therefore, management often takes action to benefit the
largest shareholder and seldom considers minority shareholders’ interests.
Especially, in China, minority shareholders cannot take listed companies to court,
because of limitations in the civil law and a lack of punishment spectrum in the
current securities laws 7 . Listed companies, therefore, are susceptible to RPTs carried
out for the benefit of the controlling shareholders.
With regard to corporate governance to the RPTs, Jian and Wong (2003) discuss
how RPTs can a) benefit the state-owned group companies as a whole including all
its shareholders; and b) be used by controlling owners to expropriate assets from

7

For example, current Chinese securities laws do not allow proportionate legal enforcement. Regulators can only
take extreme actions (prison sentences or warnings); they cannot impose moderate penalties.
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minority shareholders. The study focuses on listed firms that engage in RPTs with
their parent companies and affiliated entities such as subsidiaries of the parent
companies. Jian and Wong (2003) find that the results are consistent with the notion
that Chinese listed companies use recurring related party sales to manage earnings in
order to meet the government’s ROE requirements for rights issues or to avoid being
delisted. In addition, through related lending, listed companies divert resources they
obtain from operations to their major shareholders and their affiliates. These earnings
management and tunneling activities are more pronounced in state-owned
group-controlled companies.

3.2.2 Board characteristics
The board of directors in principle monitors management on behalf of
shareholders. Board characteristics are indicative to the functioning of board in
carrying out their monitoring tasks. The board size and ratio of independent (outside)
directors reflects a board’s monitoring power and independence, while the
managerial duality gauge the discretionary power of management.

Byrd and

Hickman (1992) intend to provide evidence on the importance of corporate boards by
examining the relationship between the presence of outside directors and the returns
to shareholders of bidding firms in tender offers. They examine 128 tender offer bids
from 1980 through 1987 and classify outside directors as either independent from or
having some affiliation with managers. The results show that bidding firms in which
independent outside directors hold at least 50 percent of the seats have significantly
higher announcement-date abnormal returns than other bidders, which indicates that
independent boards benefit shareholders. They find evidence of a nonlinear
relationship between the fraction of independent directors on a board and the
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shareholder wealth effects of tender offer bids. This result implies that all categories
of board members (i.e. managers, affiliated outside directors, and independent
outside directors) play an important role in guiding the firm, but shareholders will
not be best served by a board comprised entirely of outside directors. All results are
lost if the traditional inside-outside board classification method is used.
Beasley (1996) tests whether the proportion of outsiders on the board of
directors is lower for firms experiencing financial statement fraud than for no-fraud
firms. This study used a choice-based 75 fraud and 75 non-fraud firms selected from
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and the Wall Street Journal Index.
Results from the logit regression analysis show that no-fraud firms have boards with
significantly higher percentages of outside members than those of fraud firms;
however, the presence of an audit committee does not significantly affect the
likelihood of financial statement fraud. The results also indicate when outside
director ownership in the firm and outside director tenure on the board increase, and
when the outside director holds less directorships in other firms, the likelihood of
financial statement fraud decreases.
DeChow et al. (1996) investigate the motives for and consequences of earnings
manipulation in a sample of firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These firms are alleged to have
violated generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) by overstating their
reported earnings. They examine the ability of several previously suggested
motivations for earnings manipulation to explain the behavior of firms in this sample.
They also test whether the incidence of earnings manipulation in this sample is
systematically related to weaknesses in the firms’ governance structures. Finally, they
document the capital market consequences experienced by these firms after
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allegations of earnings manipulation were made. They find that an important
motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low
cost. The results show that this motivation remains significant after controlling for
contracting motives proposed in the academic literature. They also find that firms
manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by
management; (ii) more likely to have a CEO who simultaneously serves as Chairman
of the Board; (iii) more likely to have a CEO who is also the firm’s founder; (iv) less
likely to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside block
shareholder. Finally, they document that those firms manipulating earnings
experience significant increases in their costs of capital when the manipulations are
made public.
Using a sample of 692 publicly traded U.S. firm-years, Klein (2002b) examines
whether the magnitude of abnormal accruals (a proxy of earnings management) is
related to board or audit committee independence. The study is motivated by the
implicit assertion by the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ that
earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively
related. Klein found that there is a cross-sectional negative association between
board or audit committee independence and earnings management. When either the
board or the audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors, the
results are stronger (i.e., earnings management is more prevalent).
Gordon et al. (2004) investigate the association between corporate governance
mechanisms and RPTs. They used number of board members, percentage of
executives on the board, CEO-Chairman duality, the annual cash retainer fee paid to
board non-executive members, a dummy of director awarded stock, a dummy of
director awarded options, and the total percentage of
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shares owned by large outside

owners as the corporate governance variables. They estimate separate regressions for
the three main governance mechanisms, namely, sensitivities of CEO compensation,
board characteristics and outside monitors. The results show that compensation
structure of directors, size of board, board independence, and percentage of shares
held by the largest shareholders have significant impacts on the volume of RPTs.
Their results indicate that shareholders do not benefit from, but in fact are harmed by
RPTs, showing strong support for the conflict of interest hypothesis. Their paper
examines the relationship among the RPTs measured by the number of RPTs various
measures of corporate governance mechanisms and firm value.
Berghe and Baelden (2005) examine the issue of independence as one element
to improve board effectiveness. They focus on the monitoring role, and to a lesser
extent on the strategic role of the board of directors. Their analysis of about 40
corporate governance codes and recommendations with respect to the definition of
independence has revealed two common characteristics. First, these definitions
characterize independence mainly in a negative way by listing those elements that
disqualify a director from being considered independent. Second, almost all
definitions approach the concept of independence from a formal, structural point of
view, in a sense that independence seems to equal freedom from any possible
conflicts of interest, at all times. Instead of emphasizing independence, the paper
hypothesizes that, to ensure board effectiveness, a board of directors is needed which,
among other things, vigilantly monitors the company and institutes an objective
decision-making process. Berghe and Baelden (2005) find out that three conditions
have to be jointly fulfilled in order to achieve an efficient and integrated corporate
governance: each director should have the ability as well as the willingness to be a
critical thinker, with an independent mind; however, the environment should also
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facilitate directors to acquiring this attitude.
Davidson et al. (2005) explore whether the relationship between internal
governance and earnings management holds in an institutional environment where
corporate governance is less regulated and choice of governance mechanisms is
voluntary. Their study involves a cross-sectional analysis of 434 firms listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange for the financial year ending in 2000. They examine
internal governance mechanisms including the board of directors, the audit
committee, the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Using
absolute discretionary accruals to measure earnings management, they find that a
lower level of earnings management is associated with the presence of non-executive
directors on the board. They also find a negative association between earnings
management and audit committees comprising a majority of non-executives, but no
relationship between earnings management and committees comprised solely of
non-executives. Their results do not support the hypothesis of a relationship between
earnings management and the use of internal audit or the choice of a Big 5 auditor.
The main objective of Farber (2005) is to examine whether there is an
association between the detection of financial reporting fraud and subsequent
improvements in the quality of governance mechanisms. Farber (2005) uses a sample
of 87 firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently manipulating their financial
statements. The results indicate that fraud firms have poor governance relative to a
control sample in the year prior to fraud detection. Specially, fraud firms have fewer
numbers and percentages of outside board members, fewer audit committee meetings,
fewer financial experts on the audit committee, a smaller percentage of Big 4
auditing firms, and a higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairmen of the board
of directors. The study also examines whether improved governance influences
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informed capital market participation. The results show that stock analysts are less
likely to make earnings forecast for listed companies with financial fraud record, and
the institutional shareholding is also significant lower for fraud firms than other firms.
However, the results also indicate that firms that take actions to improve governance
have superior stock price performance, even after controlling for earnings
management.
The objectives and findings of the corporate governance papers are summarized
in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
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4. Research Hypotheses

As previously discussed, transfer pricing methods can be classified into two
main categories, i.e. market-based methods and cost-based methods. Market-based
methods use comparable market prices or adjusted market prices, which reflect the
economy of internal transfers. According to previous studies, market prices are less
easily manipulated and can minimize the disputes between managers of affiliates
(Anthony and Dearden, 1980; Cook, 1995; Granick, 1975). They are also perceived
to be more objective and fair, and are less likely to be challenged by tax authorities
(Al-Eryani, 1987). Cost-based methods include actual full cost, standard full cost,
actual variable cost, and standard variable cost. Using cost-based methods,
companies can mark up the costs. If the company’s policy is to tie the mark-up to the
prevailing market price, the transfer-pricing method is classified as a market-based
method. If the policy is to determine the mark-up based on a desired rate of return on
investment or capital, the transfer-pricing method is classified as a cost-based
method (Chan and Lo, 2004; Chan and Chow, 1997b).
Basically, cost-based methods are determined using available internal cost data.
However, cost allocation is relatively easy to abuse, and determining a fair profit to
add to cost is difficult (MaAulay and Tomkins, 1992; Merville and Petty, 1978;
Thomas, 1971). Therefore, companies can make use of cost-based method to
manipulate the transfer prices and their profits. On the other hand, when
market-based methods are used, companies’ profits are hard to be manipulated. Prior
studies find that good corporate governance can help to prevent or reduce earnings
management (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al.,
1997; La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, I expect that companies

26

with good corporate governance would be less likely to manage earnings through
transfer pricing manipulation and thus they are more likely to use market-based
pricing methods.
Previous studies document various characteristics of good corporate governance.
Good corporate governance can resolve the conflict between owners and managers
and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Generally speaking,
governance mechanisms can be classified into internal and external mechanisms.
Internal corporate governance mechanisms include the ownership structure,
executive compensation, the board of directors, financial disclosure, and so on.
External mechanisms include the external takeover market, the legal infrastructure,
and product market competition. Generally, for cross-country studies, external
governance mechanisms may have a significant impact on earnings manipulation.
My study focuses only on the impacts of the internal governance of Chinese
companies since the regulatory framework faced by China listed firms is identical as
mandated by CSRC, and the market for corporate control in China is immature and
often motivated by political concerns rather than economic logic.

Prior studies find

that ownership structure and board characteristics are the major indicators of a firm’s
internal corporate governance structure (Beasley, 1996; Berghe and Baelden, 2005;
Davidson et al., 2005; Klein, 2002b; Gordon et al., 2004; Bai et al., 2004; Liu and Lu,
2003).

4.1 Ownership
Ownership is a crucial to internal governance mechanisms. A concentrated
ownership structure allows the controlling shareholders to increase their
shareholdings and control for minimal capital expense so that tunneling becomes
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easier (Claessens et al., 2000). As discussed in Section 2, most Chinese listed
companies are controlled by the Chinese government. The government is likely to
have goals other than profit maximization, such as maintaining employment and
social stability. Therefore, the government uses the listed companies as vehicles to
achieve these policy goals even though by doing so, the shareholders’ wealth may be
reduced (Bai et al., 2000). Bai et al. (2004) find that government ownership has a
negative effect on firms’ market valuation.

Jian and Wong (2003) find that

state-owned group-controlled companies are more likely to use recurring related
party sales to manage earnings in order to meet the government’s ROE requirements
for rights issues or to avoid being delisted.
However, in the absence of due corporate governance and legal protection, large
shareholders serve as alternative ways to the corporate governance and can assure the
investors of getting a maximized return of their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
In many developing countries, state-ownership plays a similar monitoring role as the
large shareholders in the firms. Some authors (e.g. Che, 1997), observing the role
that firms formally owned by local authorities (so called township and village
enterprises or TVEs) have played in China’s growth, argue that government
ownership can serve as a commitment mechanism through which the government
will restrain itself from rent seeking activities, and even offer support.

As such

government ownership may have a positive effect on the firm’s value.

As

government can directly support their firms, these firms may be less likely to manage
earnings via transfer pricing manipulation and thus are more likely to use
market-based transfer pricing methods.

Therefore, I develop the following

hypothesis.
H1: Government-controlled firms are more likely to use market-based transfer

28

pricing methods.

4.2 Board Characteristics
Board characteristics are a second instrument through which shareholders can
exert influence on the behavior of mangers to ensure that the company is run
according to their interests. Empirical findings on the relationship between board
composition and firm performance are mixed.
I consider the relationship between transfer-pricing method and three
characteristics that have been viewed as indicators of board independence, including
board size, percent of independent directors on the board and dual CEO/chair
position. Prior studies mainly use these three board characteristics and audit
committee independence as proxies for corporate governance. Because not all
Chinese companies have established audit committees, studies on the independence
of audit committees is not applicable in my study but I include a variable to identify
the firms which have established audit committees as one of the sensitivity tests.
Prior research contends that decision-making is more effective in small boards
because having fewer people enhances the group’s collection, sharing and processing
of information (Klein, 2002a; Bushman et al., 2004b; Yermack, 1996). Similarly, a
smaller board’s monitoring ability and thus the corporate governance may be more
effective. However, from a resource-dependent respective, a large corporate board
with directors of diversified expertise performs effective monitoring and aids firms to
get more resources (Pfeffer 1972, 1973)

Overall, the conclusion on the effect of

board size on corporate governance is mixed. Therefore, I develop the second
hypothesis as follows:
H2: The number of the board of directors is related to the strength of corporate
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governance, and the choice of pricing method in a related party transaction, while
the sign of such relation cannot be predicted.
In addition to its size, its composition is viewed as an indicator of a board’s
monitoring effectiveness. While inside directors bring to the board expertise about
the firm’s activities, it is the outside directors (i.e. independent directors) who serve
as monitors and thereby mitigate agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fama,
1980). Therefore, the percentage of independent directors on the board (i.e. outsiders)
is viewed as an indicator of board effectiveness. The lower the percentage of
independent directors, the less independent the board is (Klein, 2002b; Bushman et
al., 2004b, Fama and Jensen, 1983). If a board is less independent, its monitoring
ability will decrease. Thus, it is more likely that opportunistic earnings management
will occur. In order to manage earnings through RPTs, these sorts of companies
should prefer cost-based transfer pricing methods.

Therefore, I develop the third

hypothesis as follows:
H3: The lower the percentage of independent directors a company has, the more
likely that cost-based transfer pricing methods will be adopted.

Another indicator of board independence is the dual role of chairman and CEO.
A board that has a CEO who is also the chairman is viewed as less independent and
is considered as a weaker monitor (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Weaker monitoring
usually makes opportunistic earnings management through transfer pricing in RPTs
possible. For example, the CEO/Chairman may have high incentive to maximize his
dividend by minimizing taxation by shifting profits from high tax jurisdictions to low
tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing manipulation. He/she may also simply
inflate company’s reported income by transfer pricing decisions. A CEO/Chairman
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can also transfer assets from related parties to his own pocket through trading with
the company. Therefore, cost-based pricing methods will be more likely to be used if
the CEO/Chairman wants to engage in tunneling and propping (i.e., a negative
tunneling) 8 . Therefore, I develop the fourth hypothesis as follows:
H4: If the CEO of a company is also the Board chairman, it is more likely that
cost-based transfer pricing methods will be used.

8

For the definition and cases for propping in an emerging market, please refer to Friedman et al. 2003 "Propping
and tunneling" Journal of comparative economics 31 732-750
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5 Research Methodology

5.1 Data collection
My sample includes all companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
markets from 2003 to 2005. Before 2003, the issue of the revised Guideline on the
Management of Listed Companies, there is no statute governing the disclosure
practice on RPTs and thus I select RPT cases after 2003 to insure the data reliability.
Date including pricing methods, types of RPTs, and relations between related parties,
industry, ownership structures, and board characteristics were collected from annual
reports and the research databases CSMAR and WIND. Companies with missing
information are excluded from the sample. The original sample consists of 13,267
firm-year observations. I select observations that relate to the trading of goods with
the parent company in my final sample. “Trading of goods” is the major type of
RPTs and market prices are more likely to be available for this kind of transaction.
As such, the firm has a choice between market-based and cost-based pricing methods
based on their incentives for earnings manipulation.

In addition, excluding

related-party transactions with parties other than parent companies can help to assure
that each firm will only be included in the sample once for a year. Besides, as
parent companies have more power to affect the listed firms’ decisions and previous
studies show that parent companies have a high incentive to shift profits out from the
listed firms (Jian and Wong, 2003; Gordon et al., 2004), I can investigate the impact
of ownership on transfer pricing decisions by including this type of transaction.
Finally, my sample consists of 4,515 firm-year observations after restricting the type
of transactions and the type of related parties.
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5.2 Regression Model
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression
analysis to test the hypotheses (Norusis, 1999).The logistic regression model is as
follows:
PM = α0 + α1GOV+ α2#BOD + α3%ID +α4DUAL + α5HIGH_TECH +
α6RPT/SALES + α7LN_ASSET + α8YEAR1 + α9YEAR2 +
α10MARKET + ε
where:
PM
GOV
#BOD
%ID
DUAL

= 1 if cost-based methods are used; 0 otherwise
= 1 if the company is government-controlled; 0 otherwise
= number of board members
= percentage of independent directors on the board
= 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same
person; 0 otherwise

Control Variable:
HIGH_TECH
RPT/SALES
LN_ASSET
YEAR1
YEAR2
MAEKET

= 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry; 0 otherwise
= the amount of related party transaction divided by sales
= natural logarithm of total asset
= 1 if the year is 2003; 0 otherwise
= 1 if the year is 2004; 0 otherwise
=1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise

5.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, PM, is used to differentiate transfer pricing methods
used for the RPTs. PM is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if cost-based
methods are used and 0 otherwise. The most commonly used cost-based pricing
methods include the cost-plus method 9 and profit split method 10 . The most

9

A price as determined by cost-plus method is the cost of the product plus an appropriate mark-up.
A price as determined by the profit split method is calculated b making a reasonable allocation of a controlled
group’s combined profit for related transactions with reference to the relative value of each company’s
contribution to the combined profit.
10
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commonly used market-based pricing methods include uncontrolled price 11 and
national regulated price 12 .

5.2.2 Policy Variable
The first variable, GOV, is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the largest
shareholder (ultimate shareholder) is a local government, state government or
government agency such as the State Asset Management Bureau. With respect to the
hypothesis, government-controlled firms are more likely to adopt market-based
methods. Thus, the estimated coefficient on GOV is expected to be negative.
As previously discussed, the variables #BOD, %ID and Dual represent board
characteristics typically considered indicators of the quality of corporate governance.
The variable #BOD is defined as the number of board members. Empirical studies
have found that, ceteris paribus, companies with large boards have weak corporate
governance. As I expect that companies with weak corporate governance are more
likely to adopt cost-based pricing methods, the estimated coefficient on #BOD is
expected to be positive. The variable %ID is defined as the percentage of
independent directors on the board. Ceteris paribus, when the percentage of
independent directors on the board is low, corporate governance should be weaker.
I expect that cost-based methods are more likely to be used in companies with lower
%ID; consequently, the estimated coefficient on %ID should be negative. DUAL is
set equal to 1 when the company has the same person acting as CEO and Chairman
of the board; and 0 otherwise. Ceteris paribus, when the chairman and chief

11

Uncontrolled price can be determined by internal prices or external prices. A price as determined by the
internal uncontrolled price is the price that would be appropriate to a comparable transaction between the
company and unrelated party (i.e., the market price for non-related-party transactions). A price as determined by
the external uncontrolled price is the open market price between an unrelated buyer and seller.
12
National regulated price is the price determined by the state government for certain restricted products.
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executive of a company are the same person, corporate governance should be
relatively weak. I expect that companies with the same person acting as the CEO and
board chairman are more likely to use cost-based methods. Thus, the coefficient on
Dual is expected to be positive.

5.2.3 Control variables
I include six control variables, HIGH_TECH, RPT/SALES, LN_ASSET,
YEAR1, YEAR2 and MARKET, in the regression model to control for the effects of
firm and transaction characteristics on transfer pricing methods.
I add HIGH_TECH to control for firm industry. HIGH_TECH is set equal to 1
when the company is in a high-tech industry; and 0 otherwise. HIGH_TECH is
defined according to the American Electronic Association’s high-tech definition
under the North American Industrial Classification System. If the industry of a
company is in the list of the American Electronic Association’s high-tech definition,
HIGH_TECH is coded 1; otherwise HIGH_TECH will be set equal to 0. As market
price may be less likely to be available for high-tech products, a high-tech company
will be more likely to adopt cost-based pricing methods. Thus, the coefficient of
HIGH_TECH is expected to be positive. HIGH_TECH can also control for the
impact of taxation on the transfer pricing decisions. In China, high-tech companies
usually enjoy preferential tax rates and thus companies can minimize their group tax
liabilities by shifting income into the listed companies which enjoy a reduced tax rate.
Therefore, cost-based transfer pricing methods are more likely to be used by
high-tech companies.
RPT/SALES is the amount of RPT divided by sales of the company.
RPT/SALES is intended to measure the relative amount of RPTs, which may affect
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the choice of transfer pricing method (the logic here is not adequately explained). To
control for firm size, I include LN_ASSET (i.e., natural logarithm of firms’ total
asset). Finally, to control for any possible effect of year and location of stock market
on the pricing decisions, I include YEAR1, YEAR2 and MARKET as the control
variables to control for unobserved time effect and location effect respectively.
YEAR1 is set equal to 1 when RPTs occurred in 2003 and 0 otherwise. YEAR2 is set
equal to 1 when RPTs occurred in 2004 and 0 otherwise. MARKET is set equal to 1
when the company is listed on Shanghai Stock Market, and it is set equal to 0 when
the company is listed on Shenzhen Stock Market.
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6. Empirical Findings

6.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 3, Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in my
regression, and Panel B provides statistics for the independent variables related to
corporate governance. The frequency of RPTs in each section is quite stable from
2003 to 2005. Panel A shows that in my final sample the majority (at least 73 percent)
of transactions use market-based pricing methods from 2003 to 2005. This
observation is consistent with the fact transaction involving tangible assets are
usually based on market-based pricing methods. Overall, panel B shows that
approximately 80 percent of the RPTs in the sample are conducted by
government-controlled firms and about 20 percent are conducted by “other” firms.
Panel B also indicates that only approximately 7 percent of RPTs occurred in firms in
which the CEOs and Chairmen of the board are the same person. As duality indicates
weak governance (Gorden et al., 2004), the frequency of CEO/Chairman duality
raises concerns regarding corporate governance in Chinese listed companies. The
mean number of board members in the sample is 9.77 and the average percentage of
independent directors is around 34 percent.
(Insert Table 3 here)
In Table 4, the univariate test in Panel A reports the effects of type of ownership
on the choice of transfer pricing methods. A chi-square statistics is reported for
testing whether the variables of interest are statistically independent or associated
since the variables are categorical (Michael, 2001). The percentages of transactions
that

were

market-based

were

80.28
37

percent

and

74.52

percent

for

government-controlled and other companies, respectively, a difference that is
statistically significant (Chi-square = 19.336, significant at 1 percent level). This
result is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Table 4, Panel B shows the distribution of
RPTs between Dual and Non-Dual firms. The percentages of cost-based RPTs in
Dual and Non-Dual companies are 32 percent and 21 percent respectively, a
difference which is also statistically significant. This is consistent with my
expectation that firms with CEO/Chairman duality are more likely to adopt
cost-based pricing methods. However, inconsistent with my expectation, Table 4,
Panel C indicates that firms that have larger board sizes are more likely to use
market-based methods. Panel D shows that firms with a lower percentage of
independent directors on the board are more likely to use market-based methods but
this finding is not statistically significant.
(Insert Table 4 here)
Table 5 presents Spearman’s correlations among all variables. Most of the
correlations are below 0.50. The generally modest correlations suggest the
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in the regression analysis.
(Insert Table 5 here)

6.2 Regression results
Table 6 shows the results of the main regression analysis. The overall percentage
of companies correctly classified is 78.3 percent and the model is significant at the 1
percent level, which indicates a very strong relationship between the dependent
variable and independent variables. Consistent with my expectations of H1,
Government is negatively significant at the 1 percent level. That means
government-controlled companies are more likely to use market-based pricing
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methods.

The results also show that Dual is positively significant at the 1 percent

level which support my hypothesis H4 (i.e., companies with the same person acting as
the CEO and the chairman are more likely to adopt cost-based pricing methods). This
result supports the view that state ownership as a presence of large shareholder, can
effectively monitor the management behavior in the absence of due legal protection
of investors and due corporate governance as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
and Perotti (2003).
The #BOD variable is statistically significant at the 1 percent level., Thus, firms
with smaller board sizes are more likely to use cost-based methods.

This result

supports the resource-dependent theory on board size which I mentioned earlier. The
presence of board directors with diversified expertise performs effective monitoring
task (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973). This result may also due to fact that small board size is
characterized with low democracy in China and the boards’ decisions may be easily
influenced by one or two board members.

For the firm with a larger board size, the

management needs to convince more board members that cost-based transfer pricing
methods rather than market-based methods should be used. However, the result is
inconsistent with hypothesis 3. The coefficient of %ID is not statistically
significant 13 . The reason for this may be due to the fact that there is no great
variation in terms of proportion of independent directors among the sample firms.
Other reason for these results may be that independent directors are less efficient in
developing countries than those in developed countries. Section 2 mentioned some
loopholes of the regulation of independent directors. The independent directors in
Chinese listed companies might not be really “independent”. In this case, the

13

I replace the variable %ID by a dummy variable for classifying firms which have percentage of independent
directors above and below the median instead of using the actual percentage. The results are similar to the
original model and the coefficient of the new dummy variable is not significant, and the results are not reported
here.
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percentage of independent directors may not reflect a true enhancement of corporate
governance.
(Insert Table 6 here)

6.3 Sensitivity analysis
I conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results.
First, I used an alternative definition of HIGH_TECH and replaced the variable
HIGH_TECH by HIGH_TECHa, a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the
company enjoys a high-tech preferential tax rate and 0 otherwise. The results, shown
in Table 7, Column a, are essentially the same as those reported in Table 6. Second, I
replaced the variable HIGH_TECH by HIGH_TECHb, a discrete dummy variable
representing whether the subsidiaries of the firms have preferential tax rates. If one
of the subsidiaries of the company has a high-tech preferential tax rate,
HIGH_TECHb is coded as 1. If none of the subsidiaries of the company has
high-tech preferential tax rate, HIGH_TECHb is coded 0. As shown in Table 7
(Column b), the results are similar to the original model and GOV, #BOD and DUAL
remain statistically significant.
(Insert Table 7 here)
Third, as some papers study the impact of audit committees on corporate
governance, I add a dummy variable, AUDIT, in the original model. AUDIT is set
equal to 1 if the firm has established an audit committee and 0 otherwise. The
coefficient of AUDIT is insignificant and DUAL becomes not significant.
(Insert Table 8 here)
Fourth, I exclude the firms that use national regulated prices in my sample. This
reduces the sample size to 4,279. In China, the state government exercises significant
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control on the pricing of certain necessities. Therefore, the firms may have no
autonomy on their pricing decisions for these regulated products.

Table 9 reports

the results of this sensitivity test and shows that, similar to the original regression,
the three policy variables, GOV, #BOD and DUAL are significant at 1 percent level.
(Insert Table 9 here)
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7. Conclusion

This study, based on a logit model, investigates the effects of corporate
governance mechanisms on the choice of transfer pricing methods (cost-based vs.
market-based) for RPTs. The results indicate that the type of ownership, board size
and duality of the role of CEO and board chairman have significant impacts on
transfer pricing decisions. I find that government-controlled firms, firms with large
board size and firms with different persons acting as the CEO and board chairman
are more likely to use market-based transfer pricing methods. Overall, the empirical
results enrich the existing corporate governance literature. By deliberately choice of
pricing methods, the related party transactions can be used by management as
self-dealings, propping up earnings, tunneling corporate asset for management’s own
interests. This study corroborates the extant theory that how corporate governance
deals with the agency problem, containing the opportunistic management behavior
(abuse of RPTs in this study).
Moreover, the results have important implications for public policy makers. As
the independent variables in the model are governance characteristics, public policy
makers can encourage firms to improve their corporate governance and reduce the
abuse of RPTs. Promulgation of “Guideline on the Management of Listed
Companies” indicates that the regulatory body is determined to ameliorate the
corporate governance practice of listed companies. The Chinese government can, for
example, encourage the listed companies to increase the board size and employ
different persons acting as the CEO and board chairman to reduce the risk of transfer
pricing manipulation.
There are some limitations that may affect the reliability of the results. For

42

example, I assume that the details of RPTs and the pricing methods disclosed by the
companies are accurate because they are audited by external auditors. However as
RPTs are difficult to audit, there are risks that the information disclosed is not true
and fair. Besides, as listed companies increasingly realize the importance and benefit
of observing the revised “Guideline on the Management of Listed Companies” and
make further progress in their corporate governance practice, a revisit of this issue
might generate some interesting findings.
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TABLE 1. Literature Review of Corporate Governance
Paper

Objectives

Policy Variables

Ownership Structure
Governme
% of
% of top
ntlargest
executives’
controlled shareholder
share
’s share
Bai et al. To
investigate
the
Y* 14
Y
Y
(2004)
relationship
between
governance mechanisms and
the market valuation of
publicly listed firms in
China
Beasley
To test whether the inclusion
(1996)
of larger proportions of
outside members on the
board
of
directors
significantly reduces the
likelihood
of
financial
statement fraud
Byrd and To examine the association
Hickman between the presence of
（1992） outside directors and the
returns to share holders of
bidding firms in tender
offers
14

Size of
board

Board Characterisitics
Board
CEODirectors
independence Chairman Compensation
Duality
Y

Y*

Y*

Y

Y*

*: the results of these variables are significant.
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Audit
committee
independence

Y

TABLE 1. Literature Review of Corporate Governance (continued)
Paper

Objectives

Policy Variables

Ownership Structure
Governmen
% of
% of top
tlarge
executives’
controlled shareh
share
older’s
share
Davison
To explore whether the internal
Y
et
al. governance-earnings management
(2005)
relationship holds in an institutional
environment
where
corporate
governance is less regulated and
choice of governance mechanisms is
voluntary
DeChow To investigate the motives for, and
and
consequences
of,
earnings
Sweeney manipulation in a sample of firms
(1996)
subject to accounting enforcement
actions by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
DeFond
to test whether market participants
et
al. react
favorably
when
firms
(2005)
announce the appointment of a
financial expert to their audit
committee

Size of
board

Board Characteristics
Board
CEODirectors
independen Chairman Compence
Duality
sation
Y*

Y

Y

Audit
committee
independence
Y

Y

Y

Y*
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TABLE 1. Literature Review of Corporate Governance (continued)
Paper

Objectives

Policy variables
Ownership Structure
% of large
% of top
Governmentshareholder’s executives’
controlled
share
share

To examine the association
between the credibility of
the financial reporting
system and the quality of
governance mechanisms
Gordon et To examine the relation of
al. (2004)
RPTs
with
corporate
governance mechanisms
and their association with
firm value
Klein
To examine whether audit
(2002b)
committee and board
characteristics are related
to earnings management
by the firm
Liu and Lu To
examine
whether
(2003)
earnings management in
China’s listed companies is
mainly
induced
by
controlling
owners’
tunneling activity

Size
of
board

Board
indepen
dence
Y*

Y*

Y*

Farber
(2005)

Y*

Y

Y

Y*

Board Characteristics
CEODirectors
Chairman Compensation
Duality
Y*

Y*

Y*

Y*

Y
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Y

Audit
committee
independence
Y

Y*

Y*

Y*

Table 2. Major Types of RPTS that Publicly Listed Firms Must Disclose
in China

1
2
3

4
5

6
7

8
9

Type of related party
transactions
Trade of goods

Description

Transactions which involve sales or
purchases of goods between a listed
company and its related party.
Trade of services
Transactions which involve sales or
purchase of services between a listed
company and its related party.
Trade of assets other than Transactions which involve sales or
goods
purchase of assets other than goods
between a listed company and its related
party. Machinery and buildings are
typical examples of other assets.
Leases
Operation or capital leases between a
listed company and its related party.
Loans
Loans provided by (to) a listed company
to (by) its related party (combining
principal and interest revenue or
expenses).
Commissions
Commissions paid (received) by a listed
company to (from) its related party for
providing agency services.
Overhead reimbursement
Fees paid by (received by) a listed
company for obtaining (providing)
administrative services from (to) its
related party.
Transfer of R&D
Transactions which involve transfer of
shared R&D projects between a listed
company and its related party.
Permits and franchises
Transactions which involve permits or
franchises between a listed company
and its related party.
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TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics on Variables

Panel A: Dependent Variable

No. of
RPTs

% of
the
Sample

No.
of
RPTs

Total
(2003 to 2005)
% of
% of
No. of
the
the
RPTs
Sample
Sample

1,186

80.85

1,911

78.13

3,541

78.43

281

19.15

535

21.87

974

21.57

2003
Pricing
Method1

No. of
PRTs

% of
the
Sample

Market-bas 444
ed2
Cost-based 158

73.75
27.25

3

Total
number of
RPTs

602

2004

1,467

2005

2,446

4,515

Sample size: 4,515

1. Pricing methods are the transfer pricing methods used in related party transactions.
According to previous study (Chan and Lo, 2004), I classify these methods into to groups:
cost-based and market-based pricing methods, which are commonly recognized in research.
2. Market-based methods include uncontrolled price method and national regulated price
method.
3. Cost-based methods include cost plus method and profit split method.
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TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics on Variables (continued)

Panel B: Corporate Characteristics of Sample Firms
2003
Types of
firms1
Governmentcontrolled3
Others4
Total number
of RPTs

Duality
Non-dual5
Dual6
Total number
of RPTs

2004

No. of
RPTs
486

% of
the
Sample
80.73

116

19.27

#BOD7
%ID8

602

No. of
RPTs
1,173
294

20.04

Total

No. of
RPTs
1,991

% of
the
Sample
81.40

No. of
RPTs
3,650

% of
the
Sample
80.84

455

18.60

865

19.16

602

1,467

2,446

4,515

2003

2004

2005

Total

No. of
RPTs
1,353

% of
the
Sample
92.23

52

8.64

No. of
RPTs
1,353

% of
the
Sample
92.23

114

7.77

602

No. of
RPTs
2,290

% of
the
Sample
93.62

No. of
RPTs
4,193

% of
the
Sample
92.87

156

6.38

322

7.13

1,467

2003
No.
of
RPTs
602

2005

% of
the
Sample
79.96

2,446

2004

Mean
10.07

Std.
Devia
tion
2.267

No.
of
RPTs
1467

0.331

0.056

1467

4,515

2005

Mean
9.70

Std.
Devia
tion
1.97

No.
of
RPTs
2446

0.35

0.04

2446

Total

Mean
9.75

Std.
Devia
tion
2.03

No.
of
RPTs
4515

Mean
9.77

Std.
Devia
tion
2.05

0.35

0.05

4515

0.34

0.05

Sample size: 4,515
1. The classification is based on the ultimate shareholder type from 2003 to 2005.
2. Government-controlled firms are those whose ultimate shareholders are state-owned assets
management bureaus, state-owned assets management companies or local government
agencies.
3. Others are the remaining firms in the sample, controlled by non-group and
non-government entities, for example, universities, joint ventures and individual owners.
4. Non-dual firms are those whose chairman and an executive of the company is not the same
person.
5. Dual firms are those whose chairman and an executive of the company is the same person.
6. #BOD is the number of boarder members.
7. %ID is the percentage of independent directors on the board.
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TABLE 4
Panel A: Univariate Test of Effects of Ownership on Pricing Methods
Sample size: 4,515

Government
-controlled
NO. of
% of the
RPTs
sample
2459
80.28
604
19.72
3063
100

Market-based
Cost-based
Total
Chi-Square
*** Indicates significance at 1 percent level.

Other
NO. of
% of the
RPTs
sample
1082
74.52
370
25.48
1452
100

Total
NO. of
% of the
RPTs
sample
3541
78.42
974
21.57
4515
100
19.336***

Panel B: Univariate Test of Effects of CEO/Chairman Duality on Pricing
Methods
DUAL
NO. of
% of the
RPTs
sample
226
68.07
96
31.93
332
100

Market-based
Cost-based
Total
Chi-Square
*** Indicates significance at 1 percent level.

NON-DUAL
NO. of
% of the
RPTs
sample
3315
79.06
878
20.94
4193
100

Total
NO. of
% of the
RPTs
sample
3541
79.43
974
21.57
4515
100
13.919***

Panel C: Univariate Test of Effects of Board Size on Pricing Methods
No. of RPTs

Mean Board Size?

Market-based
Cost-based
T-test of the difference in means : t-statistic =4.9738***
3541
974

9.853149
9.485626

Std. Deviation
2.124357
1.710646

Panel D: Univariate Test of Effects of Percentage of Independent
Directors on Pricing Methods
No. of RPTs

Mean %ID?

Market-based
Cost-based
T-test of the difference in means : t-statistic =0.1660 ( p-value= 0.5659)
3541
974

.3441758
.3444565
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Std. Deviation
.0460001
.0493687

TABLE 5. Correlations among Dependent and Independent Variables

PM
GOV
#BOD
%ID
DUAL
HIGH_TEC
H
RPT/SALES
LN_ASSET
YEAR1
YEAR2
MARKET

PM
1.000
-.081**
-.074**
.002
.056**

GOV

#BOD

%ID

DUAL

HIGH_TECH

1.000
.127**
-.086**
.012

1.000
-.129**
-.030*

1.000
-.037*

1.000

.082**

.017

.021

.064**

.099**

1.000

.027
-.058**
.045**
-.041**
-.039**

.026
.184**
-.001
-.016
.106**

-.001
.112**
.056**
-.026
.020

-.010
.153**
-.112**
.020
.024

.012
-.047**
.023
.017
-.032*

.011
-.028
-.014
.023
.120**

_________________________________________

Sample size: 4,515
*,**,***
Correlation is significant at the 10%，5%，1% level, respectively, using Spearman’s correlation test.

Definitions of variables:
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise;
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise;
#BOD = number of board members;
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board;
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise;
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RPT/SALES Ln_ASSET

1.000
-.040**
.002
.004
-.040**

1.000
-.023
-.059**
.125**

YEAR1

1.000
-.272**
-.192**

YEAR2

1.000
.145**

MARKET

1.000

Control Variable:
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise;
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales;
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset.
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise;
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise;
MAEKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise
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TABLE 6. Regression Results for the Impact of Corporate Governance on
the Choice of Transfer Pricing Methods
Logistic Regression equation:
PM = α0 + α1GOV+ α2#BOD + α3%ID +α4DUAL + α5HIGH_TECH +
α6RPT/SALES + α7LN_ASSET +α8YEAR1 + α9YEAR2 +
α10MARKET + ε
Independent
Variable
CONSTANT
GOV
#BOD
%ID
DUAL
HIGH_TECH
RPT/SALES
LN_ASSET
YEAR1
YEAR2
MARKET

Predicted
Sign

Regression
Coefficient
1.709
-0.396
-0.084
-0.413
0.388
0.593
0.774
-0.081
0.212
-0.198
-0.132

?
+
+
?
?
?
?
?

Chi-square
Percentage correct
Sig.

Sig.
0.053*
0.000***
0.000***
0.605
0.003***
0.000***
0.127
0.049**
0.051*
0.018**
0.108
116.631
78.3%
0.000***

________________________
Sample size: 4,515

***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Definitions of variables:
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise;
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise;
#BOD = number of board members;
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board;
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise;
Control Variable:
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise;
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales;
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset.
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise;
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise;
MARKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise
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TABLE 7. Summary of Sensitivity Test Results (Test #1 and #2)
(a)1
Independent
Variable
CONSTANT
GOV
#BOD
%ID
DUAL
HIGH_TECHa
HIGH_TECHb
RPT/SALES
LN_ASSET
YEAR1
YEAR2
MAREKT

Predicted
Sign
?
+
+
+
?
?
?
?
?

Regression
Coefficient
1.845
-.385
-0.079
-0.054
0.465
0.224
0.813
-0.096
0.230
-0.201
0.067

Chi-square
Sig.

(b)2
P-value
0.036
0.000***
0.000***
0.946
0.000***
0.017**
0.109
0.019**
0.034**
0.016**
0.412

Regression
Coefficient
1.994
-0.350
-0.079
-0.340
0.495
0.531
0.849
-0.099
0.233
-0.208
-0.072

90.900
0.000***

P-value
0.007
0.000***
0.000***
0.667
0.000***
0.000***
0.095*
0.015**
0.033**
0.013**
0.377
114.597
0.000***

_____________________________
Sample size: 4,515
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.

1. Column (a) presents the results from estimating the model with alternative proxy for
HIGH_TAXa.
2. Column (a) presents the results from estimating the model with alternative proxy for
HIGH_TAXb.
Definitions of variables:
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise;
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise;
#BOD = number of board members;
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board;
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise;
HIGH_TECHa = 1 if the company enjoys the high-tech preferential tax rate, 0 otherwise;
HIGH_TECHb = 1 if the subsidiaries of the company enjoys the high-tech preferential tax
rate, 0 otherwise; RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales;
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset.
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise;
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise;
MARKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise
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TABLE 8. Summary of Sensitivity Test Results (Test #3)
Independent
Variable
CONSTANT
GOV
#BOD
%ID
DUAL
AUDIT
HIGH_TECH
RPT/SALES
LN_ASSET
YEAR1
YEAR2
MARKET
Chi-square
Sig.

Predicted
Sign

Regression
Coefficient
1.861
-0.407
-0.060
-0.556
-0.330
-0.147
0.641
1.170
-0.640
0.105
-0.194
-0.138

+
+
+
?
?
?
?
?

Sig.
0.292
0.000***
0.001***
0.498
0.015**
0.370
0.000***
0.035**
0.126
0.358
0.023**
0.097*
101.90
0.000***

Sample size: 4,515

***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Definitions of variables:
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise;
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise;
#BOD = number of board members;
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board;
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise;
AUDIT= 1 if the company has established an audit committee, 0 otherwise
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise;
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales;
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset.
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise;
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise;
MAEKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise

55

TABLE 9. Summary of Sensitivity Test Results (Test #4)
Independent
Variable
CONSTANT
GOV
#BOD
%ID
DUAL
HIGH_TECH
RPT/SALES
LN_ASSET
YEAR1
YEAR2
MAREKT

Predicted
Sign

Regression
Coefficient
1.802
-0.327
-0.078
-0.101
-0.356
0.535
1.063
-0.056
0.140
-0.275
-0.180

?
+
+
?
?
?
?
?

Chi-square
Sig.

P-value
0.058*
0.000***
0.000***
0.904
0.008***
0.000***
0.118
0.192
0.197
0.001***
0.030***
100.85
0.000***

Sample size: 4,279

***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
We exclude all the transactions whose subject matters are mandatorily priced by government.
Definitions of variables:
PM = 1 if cost-based methods are used, 0 otherwise;
GOV = 1 if the company is government-controlled, 0 otherwise;
#BOD = number of board members;
%ID = percentage of independent directors on the board;
DUAL = 1 if the chairman and an executive of the company is the same person, 0 otherwise;
AUDIT= 1 if the company has established an audit committee, 0 otherwise
HIGH_TECH = 1 if the company is in a high-tech industry, 0 otherwise;
RPT/SALES = the amount of related party transaction divided by sales;
LN_ASSET = natural logarithm of total asset.
YEAR1 = 1 if the year is 2003, 0 otherwise;
YEAR2 = 1 if the year is 2004, 0 otherwise;
MAEKET =1 if the firm is listed on Shanghai Stock Market; 0 otherwise
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APPENDIX I

Guideline on the Management of Listed Companies
Chapter 1 Section 3
Article 12. Written agreements shall be entered into for related party
transactions among a listed company and its connected parties. Such agreements
shall observe principles of equality, voluntarity, and making compensation for
equal value. The contents of such agreements shall be specific and concrete.
Matters such as the signing, amendment, termination and execution of such
agreements shall be disclosed by the listed company in accordance with relevant
regulations.
Article 13. Efficient measures shall be adopted by a listed company to
prevent its connected parties from interfering with the operation of the company
and damaging the company’s interests by monopolizing purchase or sales
channels. Related party transactions shall observe commercial principles. In
principle, the prices for related party transactions shall not deviate from an
independent third party’s market price or charging standard. The company shall
fully disclose the basis for pricing for related party transactions.
Article 14. The assets of a listed company belong to the company. The
company shall adopt efficient measures to prevent its shareholders and their
affiliates from misappropriating or transferring the capital, assets or other
resources of the company through various means. A listed company shall not
provide financial guarantees for its shareholders or their affiliates.
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